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Adapting to Climate: A Case Study on Riverine
Flood Risks in the Netherlands
Richard S. J. Tol,1,2,3,∗ Nicolien van der Grijp,2 Alexander A. Olsthoorn,2
and Peter E. van der Werff2
Climate change may well lead to an increased risk of river floods in the Netherlands. However,
the impacts of changes in water management on river floods are larger, either enhancing or
reducing flood risks. Therefore, the abilities of water-management authorities to learn that
climate and river flows are changing, and to recognize and act upon the implications, are of
crucial importance. At the same time, water-management authorities respond to other trends,
such as the democratization of decision making, which alter their ability to react to climate
change. These complex interactions are illustrated with changes in river flood risk management
for the Rhine and the Meuse in the Netherlands over the last 50 years. A scenario study is
used to seek insight into the question of whether current water-management institutions and
their likely successors are capable of dealing with plausible future flood risks. The scenarios
show that new and major infrastructure is needed to keep flood risks at their current level.
Such a structural solution to future flood risks is feasible, but requires considerable political
will and institutional reform, both for planning and implementation. It is unlikely that reform
will be fast enough or the will strong enough.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Studies of the impact of climate change often ig-
nore adaptation,4 and studies that include adapta-
tion often follow first-order approaches under a ce-
teris paribus assumption.(2) This may well be inappro-
priate, because people’s and systems’ relations to cli-
mate tend to change due to many factors (technology,
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4 Adaptation is the knowing and unknowing response of actors and
systems to climate change, either in anticipation of or reaction
to, so as to mitigate the negative impacts of climate change and
maximize its positive impacts, whether successful or not.(1)
wealth, land use), the majority of which are not re-
lated to climate. So, to better understand reactions
to climate change, we must study the institutions that
channel people’s perceptions and intentions into ac-
tual responses to expectations of climate change.
This raises questions such as: Do water managers
realize that the climate is changing? Do they recog-
nize the implications for their tasks and objectives?
If so, are they able to react timely and adequately?
What constitute institutional barriers to implement
certain proposed flood risk mitigation schemes? And
what, given current societal trends, are the prospects
for adapting institutions to find better and feasible
responses to climate change?
In this article, we focus on water management in
the Netherlands, in particular management of flood
risks posed by the large rivers (Meuse and Rhine).
In this context, the questions of awareness of cli-
mate change and its implications are not particularly
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interesting, as everyone who has something to do
with Dutch water management knows about climate
change. We therefore largely restrict ourselves to the
conflict between what should be done about increas-
ing flood risks and what can be done in the current
and expected future institutional context. The cen-
tral question in this article is whether Dutch water-
management authorities will be able to cope with
a substantial increase in riverine flood risk. As our
answer is no, this automatically leads us to propose
institutional reform. Current decision making is too
vulnerable to being hijacked by special and local in-
terests, both in the planning and in the implementa-
tion phase. At the same time, local knowledge and
interests are disregarded. The current separation of
water management and land-use planning policies
also creates unnecessary problems for adequate flood
management.
The article has three building blocks. One is an
analysis of trends in water-management institutions
in the Netherlands.(3) The second building block is an
engineering study of future flood risks.(4) The third
building block consists of two case studies. The first is
on the implementation of a current flood management
project: the Maaswerken.(5) The second case study is
on the public acceptability of a future flood manage-
ment project: the Rijn op Termijn.(6) In this article,
we bring the three elements together to study po-
tential adaptation to flood risks in the Netherlands.
Miller et al.(7) and Cohen et al.(8) also emphasize the
importance of institutional arrangements for water-
management issues in the United States and for flood
management of the Columbia River, respectively.
Kelly and Adger(9) similarly stress the social context
of adaptation. Strzepek et al.(10) go a step further and
build scenarios of future institutions and context as
well, a more or less similar approach as the one taken
here.
The article follows this route. We sketch the cur-
rent developments in water management against the
background of societal trends, and extrapolate these
to the future (Section 2). Section 3 lays out solu-
tions to current (Maaswerken) and anticipated (Rijn
op Termijn) flood risks. The institutional responses to
these initiatives are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2. FLOOD RISK MANAGEMENT AND
TRENDS IN WATER MANAGEMENT
The Netherlands is densely populated with pros-
perous and well-educated people. Decisions are typi-
cally made through consensus. The country is formed
by the deltas of the rivers Scheldt (a rain-fed river
originating in southern Belgium), Meuse (a rain-fed
river originating in northern France), and Rhine (a
glacier- and rain-fed river originating in Switzerland).
The Scheldt River connects Antwerp Harbor to the
North Sea. The Rhine is the largest of the three rivers.
Just after passing the Dutch-German border, it splits
into three major branches (the IJssel, the Lek, and the
Waal) and a number of smaller branches. The Waal
branch connects Rotterdam Harbor to the German
industrial heartland. The country is flat. Centuries of
subsidence have left most of the country below mean
sea and river level. Dikes and dunes are supposed to
protect the country from floods from both sea and
river. Centuries of floods have left the people rather
nervous and inventive about flood risk management.
Water flows are regulated through an elaborate sys-
tem of canals, sluices, pumps, and so on. Dutch civil
engineers are amongst the best in the world when it
comes to engineering water works.
Flood risk management is only one part of water
management, although it has top priority. Under cur-
rent national law, flood risk, inland navigation, fish-
eries, leisure, rivers as a fresh water resource, and na-
ture conservation must be managed in an integrated
way. Recently, under the expectation of increasing
flood risks, the water-management community advo-
cated a more important position for water manage-
ment in national spatial planning in the Netherlands.
The possibilities for dealing with very high river dis-
charges should become one of the guiding principles
for national spatial planning.
Reflecting these multiple interests of rivers, wa-
ter management is carried out by a complex array
of authorities. An overview of the main players and
their main responsibilities can be found in References
3, 11–14. Van der Grijp and Olsthoorn(3) identify
four major trends in water management over the last
50 years. These trends may well continue to change in-
stitutions in the same direction for the next 50 years.
The first trend is internationalization, or the geo-
graphical extension of policy from the local scale to
the watershed. Water-management policy, tradition-
ally a matter of local and regional authorities, was
first nationalized by Louis Napoleon, viceroy for his
brother Bonaparte (see References 15 and 16 for a
more extensive review of the history of flood man-
agement in the Netherlands). The responsibility of
the central government for water issues was recon-
firmed in the Constitution of 1848, and strengthened
in the Constitution of 1983. Operational responsibility
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for flood safety rests with the water boards. The flood
of 1953 led to a reorganization of the water boards.
There were over 2,500 semi-professional water boards
in 1950. There are less than 50 fully professional ones
now.(11) Geographical upscaling of institutions con-
tinues at an international level. The 1986 Sandoz in-
cident5 gave teeth to the International Rhine Com-
mittee, though initially only to chew on water-quality
and pollution issues. Since the floods of 1995, mostly
in Germany, its mandate has included flood control.(3)
The Helsinki Convention provided a framework for
treaties on the Meuse.(17) The new EU Water Direc-
tive is likely to reinforce the trend of internationaliza-
tion of river water management.
The second trend is integration. Water has many
roles, and water management serves many purposes.
These include drinking water, irrigation water, navi-
gation, recreation, nature preservation, fisheries, and
cooling water. Problems may arise because of floods,
droughts, and contamination. All these roles and the
associated management goals come together in one
system, and pretending that interactions do not ex-
ist may be seriously misleading or counterproductive.
Yet, different aspects of water are often still managed
by different entities with different, occasionally con-
flicting, interests. Over the years, and particularly in
the last decade, integration of water issues has been
pushed by the central government.(18) However, op-
erational reality lags behind.(19) It should be noted
that, currently, integration more or less stops where
the water ends. Land-use planning and water man-
agement remain largely separated, although there is
considerable mutual consultation.(20)
The third trend is democratization. Engineers, bu-
reaucrats, and politicians have less to say about wa-
ter management than they used to. More stakehold-
ers get increasingly involved. This is marked by the
gradual extension of voting rights in water boards
from large landowners to all inhabitants (completed
in 1994).(19,21) More importantly, elaborate impact as-
sessments of proposed projects are now required by
law, media attention to planned infrastructure can be
enormous, and public hearings are extensive.(3) Al-
though this increases the democratic nature of deci-
sion making and thereby the quality of planning and
implementation, it may also increase its costs and slow
down the process considerably.
Note that in reaction to the (near) floods of 1995,
the Deltaplan Grote Rivieren (Delta Plan for Large
5 A factory spilled large quantities of poisonous chemicals during
a fire.
Rivers) was introduced. The accompanying law accel-
erates and streamlines decision-making procedures,
partially reversing the democratization trend. This
law applies also to infrastructure other than flood-
safety-related investments.(22)
The fourth trend is ecologicalization. Water man-
agement used to be decided on a narrow economic
and engineering calculus, and used to be biased by
typical civil engineering thinking. The upsurge of the
environmental movement in the 1970s, reinforcing the
older movement for protecting landscape and cultural
heritage, changed this. Notably, during that time, plans
to impolder the IJssel Lake and the Waddensea were
abandoned, and plans to close the Eastern Scheldt
Estuary were changed, all in favour of nature preser-
vation.(23) The thoughts behind these isolated deci-
sions are now pervasive. Civil engineering has given
way to ecological engineering. Rivers are no longer
just transport channels and a resource of fresh water,
but important recreation areas and part of the “eco-
logical main structure.” The current round of dike
reinforcements is supposed to be the last one. After
2000, flood risk management should make use of nat-
ural dynamics, rather than concrete and steel.(12)
These trends both constrain and enable future
management options. Together, they determine what
options are feasible, and which one is likely to be
adopted. Reactions to climate change should be
placed against this background.
3. A RADICAL PLAN TO COPE
WITH CLIMATE CHANGE
The implications of climate change may be quite
severe for river deltas such as the Netherlands.
The majority of general circulation models (GCMs)
project winter precipitation to increase in the Rhine
River basin.6 This would increase the risk of river
floods.(26–28)7 Earlier snowmelt in the Alps could fur-
ther enhance river floods. Sea level rise would slow
down the outflow of water. In the Netherlands, the
impact of climate change on water resources and
flood risks is clearly recognized. The works of the
6 That is, GCMs that look at the effect of greenhouse gas emissions
generally project the northern half of Europe to get wetter. GCMs
that also include sulphate aerosols occasionally project a drying
of northern Europe.(24) However, acidification policies in Europe
rapidly decrease sulphur emissions.(25)
7 Note that sizeable rivers such as the Rhine react to above-average
rainfall for an extended period (at least a month) over the whole
watershed.(29,30) GCMs are more reliable for this type of floods
than for flash floods and floods of small rivers, and the Rhine
catchment is sizeable to be resolved in a GCM.
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Table I. Annual Average Damage (in Million Guilder per Year)
Due to River Floods in the Limburg Meuse Valleya
Policy Intervention 1995 2050b
Do nothing 9.9 21.8
Embankments 0.7 1.5
Nature development 0.6–3.3 1.4–7.3
Deepen summer bedc 3.5 7.4
aAverage damage is estimated using a hydrological model of
the Meuse, coupled to a GIS database of the stock at risk from
flooding. Modeled flood damage is calibrated to the actual flood
damage of 1995 (without policy intervention). Input comes from a
stochastic weather generator, calibrated to current climate and a
scenario of future climate.
bWinter temperatures 2◦C higher than today, winter precipitation
up 10%.
cThe summer bed is that part of the riverbed that is permanently
flooded. The winter bed is only flooded in winter and early spring.
Source: Schuurman.(32)
Committee Boertien is one example, but there are
more.(3)
This committee studied flood risk management
along the river Meuse. The Meuse is a medium-
sized rain-fed river originating in the north of France,
traversing Belgium and the Netherlands to mouth in
the North Sea. The Limburg Meuse Valley is unique
for the Netherlands8 because it is hilly and there are
no dikes because the soil is such that water would
seep underneath the dike (if there were one). Severe
floods in 1993 led the government to install Commit-
tee Boertien (officially: Commissie Watersnood Maas)
with the assignment to assess what could be done to
avoid flood damages in the future.(31) The findings of
this committee with respect to the benefits of possible
options to reduce flood risks with and without climate
change (Table I) are interesting.
Table I shows the estimated annual average
flood damage for various management scenarios. The
Committee Boertien included robustness to climate
change in their study, using a temperature and precip-
itation scenario for the year 2050 that is arbitrary but
still well within the set of possibilities. Scenarios like
this should be viewed as a sensitivity analysis rather
than a forecast. A relatively modest change in climate
(a 2◦C temperature increase and a 10% precipitation
increase in winter in 2050) would more than double
the average annual damage. Medium-sized European
rivers typically respond in this way.(33,34) But, under
8 Although more common in the rest of the world. Limburg is the
southern-most province of the Netherlands, squeezed in between
Belgium and Germany. The Meuse is on the Dutch-Belgian bor-
der, the Limburg Meuse Valley is shared by the two countries.
the studied management interventions (see Table I),
average damage would be kept below the 1995 dam-
age. However, the studied management interventions
would reduce average damage by a factor of 3–16.
Thus, in the Limburg Meuse Valley, the effect of man-
agement is much stronger than the effect of climate.
That is, the impact of climate change is “noise” com-
pared to the “signal” that management potentially
effectuates. This is true for many impacts of climate
change.(35)
The situation is completely different, however,
for flood risks along the river Rhine. The flood risks
posed by the Rhine and its branches are much larger
than the flood risks of the Scheldt and the Meuse. This
has to do with the large discharge of the Rhine, and
the fact that the areas adjacent to the river are pold-
ers. Most polders are below mean river level, so if
water gets in, it needs to be pumped out, which takes
a long time. If a dike breaks, fast-flowing water would
cause a lot of damage. The traditional first response
to expectations of increased risk would be to raise
dikes. However, this approach is widely rejected as
not sustainable.
Unfortunately, no one has found a neat solution
so far to the climate-change-induced increase of flood
risks. A default solution would be to continue current
and past practice of solving problems as they emerge
(that is, after some harm is done), and picking a solu-
tion that does not upset the delicate balance of inter-
ests. This has proven to be quasi-successful, although
problems were often shifted in place or time rather
than solved.(15,16) It is doubtful whether this strategy
will be of great help in dealing with climate change
due to the scale of the problem and the state of the
current water-management system. Works to improve
the weakest dikes were accelerated in 1995. No def-
inite plans have been decided upon for after 2000.
Proposals, which focus on increasing the retention and
recreational value of the flood plains, tweak the water-
discharge system, but do not substantially alter it.
The alternative would be a radical redesign of
the delta of the water-management system. In 1998,
the research institute Delft Hydraulics(4) produced a
blueprint Rijn op Termijn. This plan is not painless, but
it could take away a number of current problems and
prevent a number of future ones. The core element
of the blueprint is to redistribute the water flow over
the three branches of the Rhine, that is, the Waal, the
Lek, and the IJssel (see Fig. 1). The Waal, which dis-
charges most of the water, is the major shipping route
from Rotterdam to Germany and back. The Lek and
the IJssel are less important.
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Fig. 1. Current (left panel) and proposed future (right panel) distribution of the Rhine’s peak flow over its branches. The 5,000 m3/s branch
is additional and only used in times of high water. It involves digging a new canal but largely relies on an earlier branch of the river.(4)
Climate change is likely to increase the peak flow.
In the study by Delft Hydraulics, the design peak dis-
charge is assumed to increase from 15,000 m3/s to
20,000 m3/s. This is an arbitrary but not implausible
scenario. The design peak discharge is the maximum
river flow—as measured at Lobith where the Rhine
enters the Netherlands—that occurs without causing
severe floods downstream. The design peak discharge
constitutes the first element of the guidelines for flood
protection. The second element of flood protection is
the acceptable risk of dike overtopping. This risk is
set by Parliament, upon advice of a committee of wise
men.(37) The current risk is 1/1,250 year, that is, river
dikes and other water works should be built such that
they fail less than once every 1,250 years. The toler-
ated risk is so low because the would-be damage is so
high. Should a dike break or be overtopped, a large
polder would fill with fast-streaming water. It would
take months to get the water out. The acceptable risk
does not comprise a valuation of personal risks.
Confronted with a higher peak flow, one could
do several things. First, water-management authori-
ties could hope that the Germans would solve the
problem, and store excess water somewhere in a reser-
voir. The current discussion in Germany suggests that
this is an unlikely scenario, for several reasons. One
such is that water management is the terrain of the
Bundeslaender rather than the federal government,
which hampers any structural solution to the flood
problems along the Rhine.(38) Another reason is that
building (temporary) reservoirs is not the preferred
option from a German perspective.(4)
Second, one could accept more frequent floods.
This is not an option in the Netherlands. The 1995
evacuation of 1 in 60 of the population is still fresh in
people’s minds, and not to be repeated. Recent at-
tempts to introduce flood risk insurance failed for
lack of interest by insurers and reinsures.(2,35,39,40)
The Netherlands is becoming a “zero-risk” society,
that is, the tolerance of involuntary risks is low and
decreasing.
Third, one could build higher dikes. This runs
against the trend of ecologicalization, and is counter
to the recently adopted government policy of no more
dike reinforcement. Dikes are considered ugly and
spoil the landscape. Dikes are also expensive, partic-
ularly if done properly. A lot of river dikes were built
and rebuilt over the centuries. It is seldom known
what they were made of, and thus they are diffi-
cult to reengineer.(4) Furthermore, there is always a
residual risk of dike failure, particularly in the light
of the uncertainty about climate change projections.
Floods in the densely populated areas of Brabant and
South Holland or the petrochemical industry near
Rotterdam would be extremely expensive. Therefore,
it would be better to relocate flood risks, which is hard
to achieve with additional dike building.
Fourth, one could increase the discharge capac-
ity of all three branches by deepening and widening
the riverbed. However, getting the water as quickly
as possible to the North Sea would cause other prob-
lems. Increasing discharge capacity would reduce
water flows in summer, which, particularly if com-
bined with higher temperatures, would enhance the
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probability of droughts, hurting nature, recreation,
agriculture, drinking water resources, and navigation.
The current, already elaborate system of sluices would
need to be substantially and expensively extended to
prevent this. Reliable and speedy navigation is im-
portant for Rotterdam Harbor, competing as it does
with Antwerp and Hamburg. Standards for navigabil-
ity of the Rhine are laid down in a treaty between the
Netherlands and Germany.(3)
Fifth, one could dig a fourth branch. This would be
expensive and risky, since such a branch would need to
run against natural geography and would require land
already used for other purposes.(4) This branch would
inevitably flow through ‘t Gooi, which is hilly and pop-
ulated by well-to-do and well-connected people.
Sixth, one could introduce a bypass. A bypass is
a river branch that only occasionally discharges wa-
ter. A report by Delft Hydraulics(4) opts for this idea.
Fig. 1 shows the consequences. If the discharge of the
Rhine at Lobith is less than 15,000 m3/s, everything
remains as it is now. All water in excess of 15,000 m3/s
is discharged northward, through the countryside of
the province of Gelderland and Overijssel, and later
joined with the IJssel to mouth in the IJssel Lake,
from where the water would need to be discharged
or pumped into the Waddensea. The bypass plan con-
tains two more features. The Waal is turned into a
canal, so that navigation is improved. The Lek is
turned into a nature reserve.
The bypass as advocated by Delft Hydraulics is
obviously not the only option, and probably not the
best one.9 It is the most detailed proposal, however,
and clearly demonstrates the scale of intervention that
is required to durably manage river flood risks in the
Netherlands. In the next section, we review the insti-
tutional implications of intervention at this scale.
4. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
The implications of the bypass plan for the
provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel are quite dras-
tic. Fig. 2 compares the current and the proposed sit-
uation. Large stretches of land would need to be set
aside for the newly created bypass. Isolated houses
and hamlets would need to go, and some villages and
towns would need to be protected by circular dikes.
The occasional flooding would be detrimental for agri-
9 See Reference 36 for tools to evaluate adaptation to climate
change in the water-resources sector. Yohe and Tol(38) develop
their own method and, applying it to the case of the Rhine, con-
clude that dike reinforcement is the most likely adaptation option.
Fig. 2. The proposed bypass and restructured IJssel River. The
light areas are currently flood-safe, but will occasionally flood in
the proposed situation.(4)
culture, so that nature development would be the al-
ternative, perhaps combined with estates. The bypass
is designed so as to minimize such impacts, but they
are still large.
Placed in the context of democratization, it is un-
clear whether the bypass or a similar plan will succeed.
Locals would be asked to leave house and hearth for
a questionable cause. In a series of interviews we con-
ducted in the area,(6) one of interviewees remarked
“Climate change? Ha! One professor says it gets wet-
ter, the other says it gets drier.” The fact is that the
current decision-making process gives considerable
weight to “not in my polder” feelings. The results
of the series of interviews suggest that farmers may
be willing to move, provided that financial compen-
sation is adequate. However, they would regret the
breakup of social life. Recent migrants to the region
particularly appreciate the current, open landscape,
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and thus oppose new dikes and other infrastructure.
Both groups, however, would be willing to accept indi-
vidual losses for the greater good, provided that social
benefits are clear to them. On the other hand, these
people could and would resist government plans if
the necessity is unclear, compensation inadequate, or
if something goes wrong in the communication pro-
cess. This group of people is well organized, and ef-
fectively influenced the planning of the Betuwelijn (a
major new railroad) and dike reinforcements in the
same area.(3)
Another issue is that the people of Gelderland
and Overijssel would be asked to bear most of the
costs (that is, increased flood risks), whereas the ben-
efits (reduced floods risks) would largely befall the
people of Brabant and Holland. Over the years, Dutch
flood management has consistently upheld the prin-
ciple of spatially equalized flood risks.(37) Similar re-
gional sentiments, particularly tensions between cen-
ter (i.e., Holland and Utrecht) and periphery (the rest
of the country), have played a role in the management
of the Limburg Meuse. People in Limburg subsidize
flood management in the west of the Netherlands,
while flood risks are substantially higher in Limburg.
This is one of the reasons why the central government
currently seeks to reduce flood risks in Limburg. Sim-
ilar arguments may lead to political problems for the
bypass plan for the Rhine River.
The Delft Hydraulics plan is not inconsistent with
the trend of ecologicalization, particularly because
the Waal does not need higher dikes and the Lek is
turned into a nature reserve. The actual bypass re-
quires engineering, though, and new dikes are needed
to protect the towns and villages of Gelderland and
Overijssel. As mentioned above, the plan disregards
upstream solutions in Germany, ignoring the trend of
internationalization.
The plan requires integration to be taken two
steps further. Most importantly, water management
and land-use planning need to be interwoven. At the
moment, the relevant authorities merely talk to one
another, and only occasionally listen. A recent exam-
ple is the Betuwelijn, the planned location of which
gets in the way of flood safety reinforcements.
The difficulties in getting different authorities and
other stakeholders to agree on policies and actions
that address problems overarching specific interests
are recognized. New ideas for water management(41)
focus on the process of finding feasible approaches
to deal with an uncertain future rather than on at-
tempting to find support for a preengineered solution
to a predefined problem. The initiative of Delft Hy-
draulics may be seen as an attempt to start such a
process.
Just how hard this is is shown by the Maaswerken
project. This project aims to improve flood safety
along the Meuse. At the same time, it seeks to further
commercial mining of sand and gravel and to develop
nature. Integration and ecologicalization are thus at
work, and so is internationalization since the Meuse
cannot be controlled without extensive cooperation
with Belgium. In fact, the project includes a slight revi-
sion of the international border. The project planning
is accompanied by extensive consultation with local
and regional stakeholders. The Maaswerken project
thus combines all elements of possible Rhine projects,
although the Maaswerken project is smaller, less com-
plex, and less controversial than a restructuring of
the Rhine. Nonetheless, the Maaswerken project is
plagued by troubles.
Ever since its inception in 1990, the project has
been overtaken by events, including floods along the
Meuse (in 1993 and twice in 1995) and the Rhine
(1995), new regulations from The Hague (on flood
management, spatial planning, and nature conserva-
tion), and new initiatives from Brussels (on interna-
tional flood management, on water management, and
on nature conservation). Initially envisaged as three
separate projects, the Maaswerken project grew more
complex over time. Priorities were revisited time and
again—on average, once every year; the emphases
shifted from gravel exploitation, to nature conserva-
tion, to flood safety, and back—in every possible se-
quence. The budget was often revised too, and funding
continues to be uncertain. Stakeholders grew impa-
tient and tired of the frequent changes. Initially coop-
erative locals withdrew support, while gravel compa-
nies and property speculators press forward. Van der
Grijp and Warner(5) extensively discuss the project.
As discussed above, this project is smaller, sim-
pler, and less controversial than the Rhine bypass
project. If implementing the Maaswerken is so diffi-
cult, how feasible are large-scale interventions in the
Rhine?
5. CONCLUSION
Climate change could seriously increase flood
risks in the Netherlands. This is recognized by the
water-management authorities, which have the tech-
nical capacity to keep flood risks at or below current
levels. The Netherlands is also rich enough to pay for
technical solutions. However, a structural solution—
such as the bypass plan sketched above—would
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require strategic thinking, political courage, individ-
ual sacrifice for the greater good, and integration of
land-use planning and water management. The cur-
rent institutional setting is such that a structural so-
lution is likely to give way to incidental solutions.
Dutch water management has a long history of partial
and short-term solutions. Continuing along this path
will entail increasing flood risks as well as suboptimal
adaptation.
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